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RONALD C. GRIFFIN*
FRED 0. BOADU*

Water Marketing in Texas:
Opportunities for Reform
ABSTRACT
Surface water marketing, as it is conducted in Texas, is assessed
to identify areas of success as well as those meriting improvement.
Overall, surface water markets have assistedthe State in responding
to changingconditions, but policy revisions are needed to repairthe
deficiencies of existing institutions. Concerningthe extension of market policy to groundwatermanagement, it is argued that the absolute
ownership doctrine employed for Texas groundwater should be removed in favor of a market-orientedgroundwatercode derivedfrom
surface water law and experience. Recommendationsfor modifying
both surface water and groundwaterlaw are offered.
The research on which this paper is based was financed in part
by the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station (TA-30152) and the
DepartmentofInterior(UnitedStates GeologicalSurvey Award Number 14-08-0001-G]725).

I. INTRODUCTION
Although it may seem distasteful, perhaps even alarming, to the uninitiated, there is a strong ideology indicating that water is better managed
as an economic commodity than as either a political issue or an administrative object.' On the other hand, it seems inadvisable to employ the
purist notion of a "free" market, due to special circumstances relating
to water.2 These special circumstances imply that an unfettered market
structure cannot be relied upon to advance social objectives in many
cases. As a result, some administrative control and structure must be
placed upon water marketing if such marketing is to serve society broadly.
Buying and selling surface water rights has long been possible in Texas,
at least in theory, although the practice is confined to the last 20 years.
*The authors are associate professor and assistant professor with the Department of Agricultural
Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843.
1. There is extensive literature on water marketing in the United States. For economic perspectives
on water marketing, see T. Anderson, Water Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation, Bureaucracy, and
the Environment (1983). Also, see various articles in 29 Nat. Res. J. (2)(1989).
2. Some economists disagree that these are sufficient grounds for limiting market influence. See,
for example, T. Tregarthen, Water in Colorado:Fearand Loathing of the Marketplace in Anderson,
supra note I.
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There are reasons to believe that the role of surface water marketing is
increasing in the state, and there is a strong need for a thorough inspection
of the impact of this institution. Somewhat contrarily, the market mechanism has a limited role in the case of Texas groundwater due to a differing
legal foundation. Texas faces an important issue pertaining to the potential
for harnessing market forces to address groundwater scarcity. Although
the present legal doctrines of other western states differ, sometimes markedly, from those employed in Texas, market-supporting revisions to water
law are being broadly considered by many states. Texas' experience may
offer information useful to states engaged in such deliberations.
In this paper we examine how well water marketing is serving the state
and identifies areas of success as well as that meriting improvement.
Policy remedies are identified for current market deficiencies, and the
potential for extending market principles to groundwater is investigated.
Some of the presented evidence offers insights for the modification of
water law in other western states. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows: Section II contains the legal background, economic concepts,
and quasi-empirical results which stand behind surface water marketing
in the State of Texas. The ideas, concepts, and principles outlined in
Section II are used in Section III to discuss the extension of the market
mechanism to groundwater. Because groundwater management is particularly problematic for the Edwards Aquifer, which serves the San Antonio
region, extra attention is focused here. The implications of our recommendations for the conjunctive management of surface water and groundwater are briefly considered in Section IV. Conclusions are presented in
Section V.
I. SURFACE WATER MARKETS IN TEXAS
Law and Economics
Through a long, evolutionary process over which various legal alternatives were tried, Texas has come to rely on the prior appropriation
doctrine for the allocation of surface water.3 The noteworthy elements of
this law are that all water users must possess a permit to divert water
from a surface water source, there is a seniority associated with this
permit relative to permits held by other water users in the basin, and this
permit is transferable (that is, it can be sold). Water permits are, in effect,
3. For an historical review, see C. Chang and R. Griffin, Water Marketing as a Reallocative
Institution in Texas, Water Resources Res., (1992) (forthcoming). In Texas the waters of the ordinary
flow and underflow of the rivers and natural streams, stormwater, floodwater, and rainwater are the
property of the state, to be held in trust for the use and benefit of all the people. See Tex. Water
Code Ann. § 11.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986). This state water is subject to appropriation. Tex. Water
Code Ann. § 11.001 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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property rights to a commodity.' In theory, this property right is limited
by the seniority system which protects more senior rights from interference by junior rights.
There are two caveats to this general portrayal of Texas surface water
law. First, Texas law prioritizes the water uses of different sectors as a
means of settling allocation disputes in general and as a means of guaranteeing, in particular, that municipal and domestic water will always be
available. In theory, interests pursuing municipal or domestic water sup-

plies possess eminent domain authority to take water from other sectors. 5
This is a clear exception to the "first in time, first in right" rule of prior

appropriations. Water appropriations that were begun after 1931 can even
be taken without compensation.6 In practice, it has been more viable to
develop additional supplies or to find willing water sellers. Second, water
law for the lower Rio Grande Valley (RGV) departs from these statements
insofar as seniority is concerned. Surface water rights in the RGV are
correlative, so that periodic shortage or abundance is equally shared by
all right holders. 7
Many economic theoreticians are unabashed in their support for the
appropriative style legal system Texas uses for surface water. They argue
that the appropriation doctrine establishes well defined property rights to
water in the form of permits, and the transferability of these permits
creates a market price for water.8 The logic employed here holds that
price is an information-rich signal about the relative scarcity of water and
that this signal urges individuals to do the right things in response to this
scarcity level. Because price induces appropriate action by people, ad4. A permit is merely a license to become an appropriator of public water on statutory conditions.
The appropriative right is a right of private property. See, Clark v. Briscoe lrr. Co., 200 S.W. 2d
674 (1947). The appropriative right or a permit may be sold and assigned without invalidating the
appropriation. See Fairbanks v. Hidalgo County W.I. Dist. No. 2, 261 S.W. 542, 545 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1923; writ dism.)
5. Under a 1931 law popularly known as the Wagstaff Act, it was established that certain water
uses are preferred over others. "It is express public policy of the State of Texas, and for benefit of
greatest number of people that, in appropriation of water, appropriation of water for domestic and
municipal uses is and remains superior to rights of state to appropriate it for all other purposes."
See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 11.024(I) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Sections of the Act also granted
eminent domain powers to political subdivisions of the State to take water necessary for domestic
and municipal uses. See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 11.033 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
6. "Any appropriations made after May 17, 1931, for any purpose other than domestic or municipal
use is subject to the right of any city or town to make future appropriations of the water for domestic
or municipal use without paying for the water." See Tex. Water Code Ann. § I1.028. (Vernon Supp.
1986). According to J. Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision-Making: A Critique, 2 J. Law
and Econ. 41, 50 (1959), "It is difficult to see how such a statute can be justified either on grounds
of economic efficiency or on those of equity and protection of investment."
7. See Chang and Griffin, supra note 3.
8. According to Anderson, "Restrictions on transferability [of water permits] are restrictions on
efficiency." Supra note I, at 4.
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ditional regulation is unnecessary. 9 In the absence of this signal, other
coercive institutions are needed to motivate appropriate production and
consumption decisions, and it can be very difficult to design a policy
which accomplishes this.
A prime difficulty with such nonmarket policies is the ability to gather,
process, and use information effectively. The information base is constantly shifting as populations, preferences, resource availabilities, and
technologies change. Command-and-control policies can establish appropriate water allocations, but, once set, the rigidity of these policies causes
them to age rapidly. By emphasizing a continuous, decentralized process
of reallocation rather than the precise allocations at any one point in time,
economists have made an interesting contribution to the management of
water scarcity.
Economic support of the appropriation doctrine pertains primarily to
water rights as transferable property rights, and secondarily to the seniority system which gives more risk-adverse water users the opportunity
to protect their specialized interests by trading for more senior rights.'"
More senior rights possess greater value to users and therefore command
higher prices.
While describing Texas water management institutions, it is important
to recognize the interface between water markets and Texas water districts.
Broadly empowered, regional water districts, usually called river authorities, were created during the 1929-59 period to assist Texas water
development efforts." River authorities operate independently and without the benefit of any state funding. As a consequence of the latter feature,
the style of these organizations has been to favor internal reallocations
of their water rights to more highly valued uses (and more highly paying
customers).
There appears to be economic cause to both celebrate and condemn
the river authority concept. On the one hand, river authority appreciation
for revenue has led them to be responsive to changing private demands.
On the other hand, they dominate particular basins to a degree that market
competition is impossible. Moreover, market participation by river au9. These ideas are based on the well known "invisible hand" arguments. To the extent that price
institutions summarize the information in the market, individuals acting on the basis of price signals
will act in their best interests and, by so doing, the best interests of society in aggregate. See C.
Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest (1977).
10. For a discussion of the economic content of the relationship between the appropriation doctrine
and property rights see T. Anderson, Water Crisis: Ending the Policy Drought (1983). On the riskdistribution characteristics of the appropriation doctrine, see H. Burness and J. Quirk, Appropriative
Water Rights and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 25 (1979).
1 . The creation and operation of regional districts for water purposes is authorized by statute,
under authority of the Conservation Amendment to the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Water Code
Ann. § 50.45 l(a) (referring to Texas Constitution Article XVI § 59).
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thorities has been confined to buying (not selling) water rights and, often,
the leasing of water to industries and cities. Monopolistic influence has
therefore tended to increase, and there is no evidence suggesting that a
reversal of this power will ever occur. To place these observations in
perspective, 13 river authorities control 25 percent of the surface water
that is consumptively used in Texas, and about 30 percent of the water
rights held by these organizations were not developed originally but were
purchased as part of acquisitions of other private or public canal companies. 2 Some basins contain no river authorities or only small river
authority operations while other basins are dominated by river authorities.
Water as a Commodity: Similarities and Differences
It is important to understand the pros and cons of depicting water as
a marketable commodity. An example will suffice. When the owner of
an orange sells it to another party, he/she sacrifices the orange in exchange
for money, and the buyer sacrifices the buying power of the money in
exchange for the orange. No one else is affected by the exchange, so
both parties are able to make good social decisions in this case. Therefore,
social interests are well served by merely establishing property rights to
oranges. Such a policy has excellent dynamic properties, because the
buyers and sellers will naturally respond to changing scarcity. If unfortunate weather in the form of a freeze reduces the production of oranges,
then price is bid up and consumption is reallocated to only the higher
valued uses. Political elements need not debate the orange needs of various
groups so as to legislate a specific course of action to address the crisis.
An administrative agency need not investigate the orange shortage and
hire consultants to study opportunities for orange conservation. The govemnment need not construct another orchard; if orchard construction is
advantageous, entrepreneurs will respond. Finally, orange management
districts appear superfluous.
Such considerations are fundamental to economic logic regarding the
merits of market-based policy. As a consequence of the similarity between
an orange and a gallon of water, economists are prone to be positive
about a market policy for the production and allocation of water. On the
other hand, if the buyer intends to consume the orange and throw the
rind on the roadside, then other people are affected. Policy needs then
become more complicated than the simple assignment of property rights.
Market policy may require some augmentation to correct the external
effects of the transaction. In this case, the establishment of litter laws
12. See J. Harper and R. Griffin, The Structure and Role of River Authorities in Texas, 24 Wat.
Resources Bull. 1317 (1988).
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Table 1. Hypothetical Water Market Effects

Conditions

I.
C sells
250af to A

III.
C sells
00aftoA

Streamflow

1000

1000

1000

Urban Diversion
Streamflow (Segment 1)
Urban Diversion
Streamflow (Segment 2)
As Return Flow (60%)
B's Return Flow (75%)
Stream Flow (Segment 3)

-500
500
-400
100
+300
+300
700

-750
250
Harm

-600
400
-400
0
+320
+300
620

Agricultural Diversion
Streamflow (Segment 4)
C's Return Flow (20%)

-500
200
+100

I.
Initial

A
B

-400
220
+80

(which limit property nghts in the orange) seems sufficient, but it is
conceivable that social interests in external effects are so weighty that
markets are not advantageous relative to the institutional alternatives.
What external effects might be associated with water rights exchanges?
Is water different from oranges in some substantive ways?
Upon close inspection, there are some potential external effects that
can be associated with surface water right transfers in general or specific
circumstances. These include return flow externalities, instream values,
and secondary economic effects. Each of these categories is a potential
source of market failure, so we will examine each in turn. In effect, each
category represents an area where market-based policy may be deficient.
The first two can be considered together.
Return Flow Externalities and Instream Benefits
Consider the simple example illustrated in Table 1. City A has a permit
to divert 500 acre-feet (af), but it only consumptively uses 40 percent of
this water with 60 percent (300 af) reentering the river at some point
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downstream as return flow. City B, A's downstream neighbor, possesses
a permit to withdraw 400 af, and its return flow of 300 af (75 percent)
occurs at the same point as does City A's return flow. Downstream, farmer
C can legally divert 500 af and the farmer's return flow is 100 af (20
percent). Column I of Table 1 illustrates the pattern of diversion, return
flow, and streamflows that result from this scenario. As a consequence
of these combined uses, streamflow has been depleted from 1,000 af to
300 af.
Now suppose that the farmer sells half of the farm's diversion rights
(250 af) to City A. City A can now divert 750 af from the river, and this
fact is depicted within column II of Table 1. Following A's diversion of
this amount, there is only 250 af in the river-an insufficient amount to
satisfy City B's permit. A market structure allowing this exchange between A and C would fail because of external effects upon B. Water users
within a given basin are dependent upon the arrangement of each other's
diversions and return flows. Changes within this arrangement can have
third-party effects which are generally termed "return flow externalities."
It is noted in the theoretical literature that a market fix can be achieved
by limiting transfers to only the consumptively utilized portion of a water
permit and barring transfers which harm third parties. 3 Like other western
states, Texas uses this suggestion by informing all potentially affected
permit holders of a proposed transfer and providing a hearing regarding
the proposal. If deleterious impacts are found, the. transfer is not approved
by the Texas Water Commission (TWC). 4 This refinement therefore appears to be a sufficient remedy, and detrimental return flow externalities
will be largely avoided. It is notable that this procedure does not aid in
the encouragement of permit transfers where there are beneficial return
flow externalities. It only limits detrimental return flow externalities.
Clearly, any process for reallocating water rights, including marketing,
faces an informational burden in discovering and accounting for return
flow effects. The present system is likely imperfect, but better options
have not arisen.
Suppose a best case scenario in which this administrative procedure is
followed. To avoid injury to City B the transfer is limited to 100 af of
diverted water with an obligation that return flow from this 100 af will
still be 20 percent (20 af). In the aftermath of this transaction the situation
identified by the final column of Table I is obtained. Overall, it can be
positively observed that all permit holders are satisfied and final streamflow is maintained at 300 af so that unrepresented, downstream users are
unaffected.
13. See L. Hartman and D. Seastone, Water Transfers: Economic Efficiency and Alternative
Institutions (1970).
14. See Chang and Griffin, supra note 3.
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An expanded perspective and further inspection reveals, however, that
instream flow regimes have been affected. There are four consecutive
stream segments of interest beginning with the point of A's diversion and
ending at the point of C's return flow. Contrasted to the pretransfer
scenario, streamflows have changed along all four segments. For the first
three, streamflows have been reduced. Streamflow for the fourth segment

has been enhanced. In general, the reduced streamflow can be damaging
to streamflow users along segments 1-3, and streamflow users along
segment 4 can be benefited. Instream values relating to recreation, aquatic
and wildlife habitat, general aesthetics, estuary inflows, and the assimilation of pollution are attracting increased attention, both within economic theory and water law. 5

The most noteworthy point is that instream flow effects constitute yet
another form of external effect, and unless instream users participate in
market activities in a unique manner, economic efficiency may not be
served by a water market. 6 An interesting alternative is to employ agencydefined economic incentives to subsidize downstream transfers of water
rights and to tax upstream transfers of water rights as a means of ac-

counting for instream flow values that might otherwise be undervalued.' 7

Such a policy would be relatively simple to apply given that administrative
approval of transfers is already required, and it would also avoid the
demand revelation problem caused by the public good character of many
instream uses. "8There are several regulatory alternatives for addressing
instream water demands, but the prospective interface between these
15. For an excellent discussion of the many important issues associated instream water uses, see
L. MacDonnell, T. Rice, and S. Shupe, Instream Flow Protection in the West (1989).
16. By definition, instream users do not divert water so their interests in the water resource are
on somewhat incompatible terms with the interests of diverters. Not only is there competition for
limited water, but diverters and instream users care about different dimensions of the water resource.
Diverters care about diverted and consumed quantities; instream users care about flow quantities
and lake levels. The dimensioning problem confuses simultaneous market participation by both user
groups. Diverters need to hold permits to divert water. Instream users are unaffected by diversion
activities as long as the diversions occur downstream from the location of their interests. Therefore,
instream users do not have to buy diversion permits to enhance instream benefits; they can just as
effectively enhance instream flows by subsidizing the reallocation of diversion permits to diverters
downstream. As a second important issue, there is often a high degree of nonrivalry and nonexclusivity
associated with instream uses. These are the two technical conditions necessary to define a public
good. To illustrate: during a period of low river flow along a certain segment, additional flow could
benefit many individuals and, if congestion is not a problem, the amount of extra benefit received
by one individual will be largely independent of the benefits experienced by others. This is nonrivalry.
If instream users can enjoy these benefits without cost because there is no effective means of excluding
them (nonexclusivity), then we confront the classic free rider (or demand revelation) problem
associated with public goods. Markets cannot produce or allocate public goods efficiently because
of these two conditions. See R. Boadway, Public Sector Economics (1979).
17. See R. Griffin and Shih-Hsun Hsu, The Potentialfor Water Market Efficiency When Instream
Flows Have Value, Am. J. Agric. Econ. (1992) (in review).
18. See the explanation of note 16.
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institutions and water market institutions is problematic. This is as it must
be, for at issue is the matter of allocating water between instream and
diversionary water uses.
Secondary Economic Effects
The third area of possible market failure pertains to secondary effects
and so-called "area-of-origin" concerns. Market reallocations are dominated by agricultural-to-urban transfers which often infers that there are

distinct exporting regions (areas-of-origin) and importing regions (areasof-receipt). From the perspective of the area-of-origin, the transferred

water represents a lost resource base, and this is a major concern throughout the West.' 9 Economists sometimes tend to dismiss this perspective as
protectionism and as a barrier to the achievement of economic efficiency.2'

It is professed that negative secondary effects for the area-of-origin are
balanced by the positive secondary effects for the area-of-receipt in a full
employment economy. This argument is available only when the accounting stance remains broad enough to encompass both regions. Local
business interests and their political representatives cannot be so generous.
Recent literature is mindful of the importance of water resources to local
development and welfare opportunities. 2 For the economist whose concerns extend beyond the limited norms of economic efficiency embodied
in potential Pareto optimality or Pareto optimality, there are potentially
crucial distribution matters involved in water market advocacy, and these
concerns represent another potential market failure.
19. To deal with secondary effects and "area-of-origin" concerns, a 1913 Texas law states that
"no person may take or divert any of the water of the ordinary flow, underflow, or storm flow of
any stream, watercourse, or watershed in this State into any other natural stream, watercourse, or
watershed to the prejudice of any person or property situated within the watershed from which the
water is proposed to be taken or diverted." See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 11.085 (Vernon Supp.
1986). The Texas Supreme Court has held that prejudice is to be determined by weighing the
detriments to the basin of origin against the benefits of the diversion. See City of San Antonio v.
Water Comm'n, 407 S. W. 2d 752, 759 ( TEX. 1966). Passed in 1965, the Water Resources
Administration and Development Act authorized the development of a state water plan and explicitly
prohibited "any plan which contemplates or results in the removal from the basin of origin of any
surface water ... required to supply the reasonably foreseeable future water supply requirements
for the ensuing fifty-year period within the basin of origin, except on a temporary interim basis."
See Acts 59th LEG., p. 587 ch. 297, 583-604 § 3(b). C. Johnson and L. Knippa have referred to
this provision as a "fifty-year lock-up" and have argued for its removal. See Transbasin Diversion
of Water 43 Tex. L. Rev. 1035 1965. For a good discussion of area-of-origin problems in Western
states, see L. MacDonnell, C. Howe, J. Corbridge Jr. and W. Ahrens, Guidelines For Developing
Area-of-Origin Compensation (1985).
20. See supra note I and references therein.
21. For example, see studies by F. Brown and H. Ingram, Water and Poverty in the Southwest
(1987); H. Ingram and C. Oggins, Water, The Community and Markets in the West (1990); Also,
see K. Weber, Effects of Water Transfers on Rural Areas: A Response to Shupe, Weatherford, and
Checchio. 30 Nat. Res. J. 13 (1990).
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The problem of secondary effects is an inherently normative topic, and
the science of economics seems ill suited for prescribing a cure when no
illness is believed to be present.22 It should be recognized that all allocative
institutions, not just markets, must confront this issue. For example, the
management of the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA) continues
to struggle over the potential reallocation of its extensive water right
holdings. While the vast majority of this water has been committed historically to a productive rice industry, upstream, Austin-based interests
are seeking water for urban use and the maintenance of stable lake levels
during the summer. If revised LCRA policies result in a substantive
reallocation and a consequent reduction in rice production, the rural riceproducing region will clearly suffer.
Texas Water Marketing: Activity and Benefits
Based upon both formal and informal observations, it appears that
Texas has had a positive experience with surface water marketing. The
only concrete Texas evidence emanates from water market operations in
the RGV where seniority is absent, so a measure of the value of seniority
cannot be established. Purchase and lease prices of RGV water rights can
be obtained and contrasted to use values. During the 20 years since a
final determination of water rights in the RGV, some 150 + transfers
have occurred.23 Ninety-nine percent of these transfers are from agricultural to nonagricultural use. Transfers from agriculture to municipalities
have amounted to nearly 75,000 acre-feet. 24 Forty-five percent of current
urban holdings of water rights were possessed by agriculture twenty years
ago. Water rights have traded at prices ranging roughly from $450 to
$600 per acre-foot, and water can be leased for one season at $15-$18
per acre-foot' There are no river authorities operating in the RGV. The
many water districts of the RGV participate in rental markets as both
lessors and lessees, but they do not sell water rights. Sales have been
from private individuals and firms. 6
22. Although economics is a normative science, in its predominately neoclassical form there is
little room for considering secondary effects. Because any identified secondary effect is thought to
be offset by an equal and opposite effect elsewhere, it is generally held that the issue is one of
income distribution rather than allocative efficiency. Even though they are uniquely postured for the
task, most economists are reluctant to make recommendations involving matters of income distribution. See J.Hamilton, N. Whittlesey, M. Robison, and J. Ellis, Economic Effects, Value Added,
and Benefits in Regional ProjectAnalysis, 73 Am. J.Agric. Econ. 334 (1991).
23. A detailed study of the lower Rio Grande water market has been conducted by Chang and
Griffin, supra note 3. The information presented in this section is condensed from Chang and Griffin.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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Chang and Griffin selected some representative 1983-84 transfers to
estimate the agricultural value of traded water as well as its new value
in municipal use. 27 Consultations with transactors indicated that much of
the sold agricultural water would have otherwise been unused by its
owners. Agricultural water values can be bounded above, however, by
making the generous assumption that irrigation water would have been
devoted to cotton production. After including government farm program
payments to capture private agricultural values, it was determined that
the sacrificed value of sold water compounded over a fifty-year period
ranged from $300 to $2,300 per acre-foot depending upon expected cotton
prices and dryland cotton yields. This contrasts with municipal benefits
that range from $6,500 to $21,000 per acre-foot depending upon future
rises in municipal utility rates.2" Municipal benefits were computed as
the added consumer surplus provided by the water purchase after accounting for projected rate increases and population growth over a fiftyyear planning period.
These findings indicate that the net value of these transfers can be
rather large. Assuming that the average transfer produced $10,000 of net
benefits per acre-foot, there is a sizable aggregate value for the 75,000
af transferred from agricultural to municipal use during the past twenty
years. The extension of these results to the rest of Texas or other states
is ill advised for several reasons. The return flow externality and secondary
economic effects issues are largely absent in this region. Return flows
are negligible because of proximity to the Gulf of Mexico. Water transfers
are generally local, and the secondary economic effects problem is rather
moot. Moreover, instream flow values are relatively unaffected by marketing in the RGV.29 Finally, this is a region of very high population
growth which causes unusually high municipal benefits.
These results provide some testimony, albeit a likely best case scenario,
regarding the potential merits of market-based policy. In the absence of
transferable water rights, what would have transpired during the two
decades since adjudication in the RGV? After all, marketing operations
have nearly doubled municipal water supply during this period. We submit
that there would have been a substantial amount of political haranguing,
calls for legislative action, formation of special interests groups, and
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Rio Grande flows are slight except for releases from upstream reservoirs. As a consequence
of this fact, water administrators view the lowermost reservoir as the diversion point for all downstream diversions. Because reservoir releases travel across essentially the same stretch (diverters are
concentrated close to the Gulf), it is felt that transfers are inconsequential for either return flows or
instream flows.
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excruciating interdisciplinary studies of the water problems of the Rio
Grande Valley basin. Instead, reallocation in the RGV has occurred steadily and without fanfare.
Needed Refinements in Surface Water Marketing Institutions
Overall, there are some compelling reasons to believe that surface water
marketing is serving the state well. If this is to continue into the future,
additional legal and administrative refinements will be required to meet
changing goals and socioeconomic settings as well as accounting for the
different physical circumstances of other areas. The needed refinements
in surface water marketing institutions relate to three principal concerns:
return flow externalities, instream flow values, and secondary economic
effects.
Return Flow Externalities
Return flow externalities are, for the moment, sufficiently accounted
for in Texas water law. It was stated earlier that Texas third parties are
protected from detrimental return flow externalities which might result
from water right transfers. Water law or, more accurately, administrative
procedure is adequate in this way. It is interesting to observe that while
third parties are receiving protection from the harms of water transfers,
they are not protected from return flow changes which occur when a water
user changes a water use practice. For example, a farmer may freely alter
irrigation technology to a more efficient system, allowing an increase in
irrigated acreage with no increase in water diversions. A likely side effect
of such a decision will be an increase in the consumptive use of water
and a decrease in return flow. Similarly, cities have urged residents to
engage in conservation measures, many of which increase the ratio of
consumed water to diverted water, with negative consequences for return
flows. 3" Water reuse programs, such as tailwater recovery by farmers and
golf course irrigation with effluent by cities, are clearer examples of
30. The conservation measures initiated by cities in Texas are partly in response to the initiative
taken by the 69th Texas Legislature in redefining water conservation in the Water Code to include
both the development of water resources and those practices, techniques, and technologies that
reduce the consumption of water, reduce the loss or waste of water, improve the efficiency in the
use of water, or increase the recycling and reuse of water so that a water supply is made available
for current and future consumptive and non-consumptive uses. Act of May 23, 1985, ch. 133,
§ 1.09, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 630, 635 (Vernon) (Codified as Tex. Water Code Ann. § 1134
(Vernon Supp. 1986)). The legislation became effective upon the passage in November 1985 of the
constitutional amendments which were proposed by Tex. H.R.L 6, 69th Leg., 1985 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv., A-100 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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technology adoption which harm third parties through reduced return
flow. 3
Legal reform for accomplishing a more complete treatment of return
flow interrelationships must involve a more accurate conceptualization
of the ways in which people use and benefit from water. At this juncture
in the history of evolving water scarcity it is important to recognize that
the individuals responses to changing scarcity can alter diversion and/or
consumption quantities. Both impacts are important to other users. It
follows then that there are properly two sticks to be emphasized in the
property rights bundle having to do with water. To date, water law of
the western states has emphasized one stick, to wit, allowed diversion
quantity, with various regulatory bandaids being applied in attempts to
repair the inadequacies of this narrow notion. A preferred approach may
be to distinguish two property rights in water: a right to divert a fixed
amount of water and a right to consume a fixed quantity of water. Not
only could water marketing be extended to trade in both types of rights
(thereby internalizing the return flow externality), but such a system of
water rights would also erect appropriate incentives for individuals modifying their practices of water use.
Instream Benefits
At least one author has argued for a rearrangement of sectoral water
priorities to rank instream flow needs highly and thereby authorize the
TWC to grant instream flow appropriative permits, deny other permit
applications on the basis of possible instream flow related damage, and
condition diversion permits so that environmental damages are lessened. 32
This approach is close to what is needed, but it (1) is overly regulatory,
(2) fails to effectively harness the Texas surface water market, and (3)
fails to recognize its impact upon water reallocations that will be needed
in the future. The sectoral priorities have never been an effectual basis
for allocating water and consequently have never found much application.
Quite simply, it cannot be maintained that a particular type of water use
is more beneficial than another in all circumstances. But Johnston is
correct in noting the need for allowing appropriative permits to be held
31. Water reuse projects are on the increase in Texas. For an excellent discussion of the legalinstitutional questions raised by these projects, see F. Booth, Ownership of Developed Water: A
Property Right Threatened. 17 St. Marys L. J. 1185 (1986). Also, see S. Peel, Acquisition of
Municipal Water Rights in Texas: A Conceptual and Operational Analysis. 17 Tex. Tech. L. Rev.
811 (t986).
32. See the discussion by J. Johnston, Environmental Significance of Instream Flows, 17 St.
Marys L. J. 1297 (1986).
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for instream uses. Instream users, user groups, and representative agencies
(such as water districts, river authorities, and the Texas Department of
Parks and Wildlife) should be allowed to apply for permits of unappropriated waters and purchase water rights from currently licensed water
diverters.
A good argument can even be constructed for a one-time reapportionment of water from current diversionary uses to instream use as a means
of redressing past policy deficiencies which tipped the scales against
instream uses. Whether public trust or some other concept is employed
to accomplish this realignment is not as important as the need to assure
water users that the heavy hand of government will be reluctant to again
perform the service. After a one-time exercise of reapportionment, changes
in instream water demand can be accommodated through market activities
or incentive-based policies such as the tax/subsidy scheme suggested
previously.33 Once instream uses have achieved equal standing and protection, further threat of intervention can only undermine decentralized
policies and encourage unproductive expropriative effort and defensive
action. It has long .been acknowledged that property rights to water require
a large degree of tenure certainty if water markets are to operate effectively.34
If market policy is expanded to incorporate instream flow users or user
groups, the TWC practice of notifying other water users regarding proposed transfers and conducting hearings to assess third-party impacts
should include notification of those permit-holding parties dependent upon
instream flows. In the absence of such changes, the default approach
could be the burdensome exercise of the public trust doctrine in courtrooms on an individual, case-by-case basis. Experience indicates that this
is an onerous, time-consuming, and costly alternative.
Secondary Economic Effects
The issue of reform for acknowledging secondary effects is still more
perplexing. If it is determined that deleterious secondary effects are cause
for moderating so-called reallocations to "highest and best use," then it
may be possible to devise schemes for compensating areas-of-origin."
Exporting regions could obtain the legal authority to levy taxes upon
water exports and devote the resulting receipts into economic development
33. See Griffin and Hsu, supra note 17.
34. On this point, both the courts and economists are in agreement. For an excellent discussion
of these principles by economists, see S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria
for a System of Water Rights, 32 Land Econ. 295 (1956); and, Milliman, supra note 6. From the
perspective of Courts, see, generally, Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 United States 941, 953 (1982).
35. See MacDonnell, supra note 19.
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projects. A similar proposal would be to require that all sales be conducted
through an area "Water Marketing Board" with the stipulation that proceeds be allocated by formula among the seller and local interests. If
status quo economic relationships between current water users and area
businesses and workers are grounds for protection, we must be mindful

of the consequences. Perhaps foremost among these is the inertia conveyed to water rights. Far fewer water rights will be reallocated to new
uses if it is necessary to compensate the indirect beneficiaries of the old
uses.

III. THE POTENTIAL FOR GROUNDWATER MARKETS IN TEXAS
Law and Economics

Groundwater is administered in Texas according to the principle of
absolute ownership--a doctrine derived from English common law.36
Texas landowners may extract groundwater from beneath their land as
long as their use is not wasteful." The condition of no waste is a very
light burden in the state as interpretation extends only the landowner's
practice of use, not in relation to alternative, perhapsmore highly valued,
uses by other individuals.3" With respect to water marketing, the land36. Groundwater in Texas is defined by the statute relating to underground water conservation
districts as water suitable for agricultural, gardening, domestic or stock-raising purposes, percolating
below the earths surface. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 52.001 (Vernon, 1986). Texas courts have held
that Percolating waters are exclusive property of owner of surface of soil and owner has all rights
incident to them that one might have as to any other species of property Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117
Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273 (1927). The English rule announced in Acton v. Blundell, 12 M.2.W. 324
(1843) was adopted in the case of Houston T.C.R.R. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904).
The rule states that, the person who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there
found to his own purposes at his free will and pleasure; and that if, in the exercise of such right,
he intercepts or drains off the water collected from underground springs in his neighbors well, this
inconvenience to his neighbor falls within the description of damnum absque injura, which cannot
become the ground of an action, at 280.
37. The limitation of the English rule is that the owner may not maliciously take water for the
sole purpose of injuring his or her neighbor, Cantwell v. Zinser, 208 S.W. 2d 577 (1948, CA)
(landowner has no right to intercept and waste percolating waters to detriment of adjoining landowner,
or wantonly and willfully waste it. See Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W. 2d
798 (1955); Pecos County WaterControl & lmprov. Dist. v. Williams, 271 S.W. 2d 503 (1954,
CA) (writ ref in re) (holding landowner owns percolating water under his or her land and can make
nonwasteful use of it)). Also, see Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, Inc., 576
S.W. 2d 21 (1978, Tex.).
38. The "use test" is well established in Texas law and is codified under Tex. Water Code Ann.
§ 11.205 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Thus, for example, in Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 276 S.W. 2d
798, 802 (1955) in which plaintiff charged that water losses due to the means of transportation from
place of capture to place of use constituted waste, the Texas Supreme Court interpreted the statute
to mean that "the transportation of artesian water by specified means ...constituted waste and was
unlawful only if the water was put to an unlawful use."
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owner does not hold title to specific units of water beneath his land. 9
Thus, groundwater marketing is limited to two forms in Texas. The
landowner may "reduce groundwater to ownership" by pumping it after
which it can be sold and transported. Or the land itself may be sold, after
which the new owner may pump water and apply it to a different use,
perhaps somewhere else. TexasHigh Plains cities relying on the Ogallala
Aquifer have purchased nearby irrigated farmland to enhance municipal
water supply. There is at least one Oklahoma city (Altus) which has
acquired Texas land for this use.
Despite occasional use, these market forms are quite limited in their
ability to address growing water scarcity. The fundamental issue is that
a groundwater user cannot contract with another groundwater user for a
reduction in one's pumping so that the other may increase pumping.
Economists have argued for the legal reform necessary to use this third,
most comprehensive market form, which is active in some states." The
basic reform is to adjudicate groundwater rights and assign quantitative
permits to users. Before pursuing the point further, there is a logically
prior matter. What third-party impacts would accompany a general
groundwater market and are these sufficiently extensive to recommend
nonmarket, regulatorypolicies over marketing?
The earlier surface water discussion provides considerable insight for
obtaining answers to this all-important question. Of the three classifications of surface water external effects, two are clearly relevant to groundwater: return flow externalities and secondary economic effects. A third
category, instream values, is irrelevant in the case of groundwater." On
the other hand, two new sorts of external effects peculiar to groundwater
emerge: inter temporal externalities over the depletion rate of groundwater
stocks and the impacts of well drawdown upon neighboring wells. Thus,
four possible market failures associated with groundwater marketing need
to be addressed: return flow externalities, secondary economic effects,
inter temporal externalities, and well drawdown.
39. One commentator has argued that the designation of the English rule as absolute ownership
is not exactly accurate. What the landowner has absolute ownership of is the water after he has
removed it from the soil and reduced it to possession, see A. Walker, Theories of Ownership and
Control of Oil and Gas Companies with Those of Groundwater, in Proc. Water Law Conference,
Univ. of Texas (1956). A contrary view holds that the owner of the surface does, with minor
exceptions, own the water under it just as he owns the oil and gas. See J. Greenhill, (in the same
Proceedings). See discussion in W. Hutchins, The Texas Law of Water Rights (1961). For a recent
discussion of those issues see C. Johnson, The Continuing Voids in Texas Water Law: Are Concepts
and Terminology to Blame? 17 St. Marys L. J. 128 (1986).
40. M. Gisser, Groundwater: Focusing on the Real Issue. 91 J. Pol. Econ. 1001 (1983).
41. Groundwater-surface water interactions can cause groundwater reallocations to have relevance
for instream flows, but we are addressing pure groundwater scenarios at the present time.
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Return Flow Externalities and Secondary Economic Effects
As in the case of surface water, return flow to the aquifer subsequent
to groundwater use creates third-party effects that are relevant to market
exchanges. Adequate control of return flow external effects is possible
by limiting exchanges to the consumptively utilized portion of a groundwater permit. Secondary economic effects are also at issue for groundwater exchanges--again giving rise to the difficult question of whether
to protect sectors which are economically linked to water right sellers.
With regard to policy needs for managing aquifers serving rural areas,
the question of secondary effects can become a crucial issue due to the
limited economic alternatives for those people who are economically
dependent upon irrigated agriculture.
Intertemporal Externalities
Present groundwater law provides landowners with broad latitude in
choosing the rate at which they mine nonrenewable groundwater stocks.
It is theoretically well established that profit-maximizing groundwater
users do not ignore future interests in groundwater availability. Rather,
they logically trade off the value of present use against the opportunity
costs of future uses, and vice-versa, with personal discount rates having
critical bearing upon this decisionmaking. The lesser the discount rate,
the greater the incentive to conserve groundwater supplies for future use.42
Of course, in highly permeable and transmissive formations such as the
Edwards Aquifer, which serves the San Antonio region, the fugitive nature
of the groundwater resource implies that individual decisions to conserve
water for the future do not prevent others from using it.
It is also well established that the use of discounting in such decision
processes constitutes formal dictatorial rule by the present generation
when society is conceived as the aggregate of all people, present and
future.43 Therefore, a perception of future people as equal members of
society would require that a zero discount rate be employed in assessing
the optimal rate of depletion for groundwater. This would have dramatic
42. Using the illustrative example of a purely exhaustible and nonrechargable aquifer, a competitive market system will "mine" the aquifer at a rate which maintains p,=poe " across all time
periods. Here, p, is the net value of water (after pumping costs are paid) per unit of water in period
t, e is the base natural logarithmic constant, and r is the personal discount rate. Thus, net water
value must grow at the rate of interest, and this is controlled by the rate of groundwater withdrawal.
Other things being equal, an increase in the discount rate implies that net water value must increase
more rapidly over time, and this can only be accomplished through a higher rate of depletion. See
H. Hotelling, The Economics ofExhaustible Resources, 39 J. Pol. Econ. 137 (1931).
43. See J. Ferejohn and T. Page, On the Foundations of Intertemporal Choice, 60 Am. J. Agric.

Econ. 269 (1978).
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implications for groundwater use where such use relates to nonrenewable
stocks. In particular, application of a zero discount rate may well indicate
that no groundwater mining should be undertaken currently.
While technological advance achieved through investment by the present generation is typically advocated as a genuine offset for resource
depletion, a balanced appraisal probably culminates by acknowledging
that private discount rates are too high for serving a society which perceives future people as its members, even if they are lesser members.
Although groundwater marketing is not the lone institution possessing
this failure, a complete proposal for revising groundwater law to support
water marketing should address this issue clearly.' It may be desirable
to remove groundwater depletion decisions from market purview by fixing
annual groundwater rights through a more socially sensitive process than
that offered by the investment-oriented mindset of a particular generation
of people, where each person is constrained to individual (rather than
collective) action and is powerless to conserve for future peoples without
jeopardizing one's own economic position. Once annual groundwater
rights are established by nonmarket process, ensuing trade among current
and prospective groundwater users would then influence water allocation
across alternative uses statically but not dynamically.
Drawdown Externalities
Unless groundwater rights are carefully defined, a groundwater market
will involve uncompensated external effects between users due to water
table drawdowns. Thinking of groundwater rights as transferable rights
to derive net benefits from the groundwater resource, it is clear that
pumping lifts are important determinants of these benefits. Many groundwater right transfers would likely result in an altered geographic distribution of groundwater withdrawals, thus altering local patterns of drawdown
even when total aquifer extraction is unchanged.4 These changes may
well harm third parties while assisting others. In this same vein, it has
been argued that "absolute ownership" is a misnomer for Texas groundwater principles, because the groundwater user is not protected from water
table declines brought on by one's neighbor.'
Possible legal remedies for this external effect include (i) well spacing
regulations or (ii) flexible standards of "reasonableness" involving the
44. All proposable mechanisms for balancing "consume now" versus "conserve for later" issues
will be unavoidably attentive to the wishes of those at the table. The absence of future people does
not mean that they are unconsidered, however, for they can be represented altruistically.
45. See J. Emel, Groundwater Rights: Definition and Transfer, 27 Nat. Res. J, 653 (1987).
46. See Johnson, supra note 39.
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degree of permitted injury upon third parties." 7 According to Emel, these
corrections are inferior to a third remedy: the establishment of fixed,
quantitative criteria concerning the amount of well interference which is
permitted in any given area. Under the latter system, a proposed transfer
of the consumptively used portion of a groundwater right should be
analyzed by the prevailing hydrologic simulation model for the aquifer.
If the transfer does not cause the criteria to be exceeded, the transfer is
approved. 4"
The Edwards Aquifer
As a more precise backdrop for further discussion, it is useful to survey
important features of the critical Edwards Aquifer problem being faced
within the area surrounding San Antonio. The aquifer is unique in its
very high transmissivity, resulting from its fractured limestone structure.
San Antonio is the nation's third largest city that is entirely dependent
upon groundwater, all of which comes from the Edwards.4 9 San Antonio's
wells are among the world's most productive. As a result, residents here
and in neighboring communities pay some of the lowest water rates in
the state.
The aquifer is recharged at its western outcropping in the Nueces River
basin. Groundwater flows out of the basin eastward, serving first as an
important source of irrigation water in a semiarid environment. From
there water flows through the portion of the formation underlying San
Antonio whose original settlement occurred because of springflow (no
longer active). Finally, Edwards' groundwater discharges at several springs.
The most important of these springs, Comal and San Marcos, yield large
discharges which are important to the availability of surface water in the
Guadalupe River basin. 50 Even more crucially, these springs are environmentally unique, home to some endangered species existing nowhere
else, and the clear, scenic waterways attract large numbers of recreationists and their economy-supporting expenditures.
Annual aquifer recharge averages 635,500 acre-feet but has varied from
43,700 to 2,003,600 acre-feet. 5 Varying recharge is quickly reflected in
well water levels and springflows. Maximum annual pumpage for the
1978-88 period has been estimated at 588,000 acre-feet, omitting springflows.52 Municipal and military use accounts for 288,000 acre-feet of this
47. See Emel, supra note 45.
48. Id.
49. See 7 United States Water News, 12, 1 (June 1991).
50. Special Committee on the Edwards Aquifer, Committee Report to the 72nd Legislature,
January 8, 1991, pp. 38-9.
51. Id., at 3,25.
52. id., at 12.
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amount but continues to grow, and San Antonio is still developing new
wells.5 3 Agricultural use is 230,000 acre-feet.' The expected negative
relationship between springflows and total pumpage has been demonstrated empirically." Even if current rates of pumpage are maintained, a
reoccurrence of the drought of record is estimated to dry Comal Springs
for a nine-year period.-" Under the same conditions, the San Marcos
spring will continue to flow at a reduced level, though perhaps not yearround. 57
Political tensions remain high in the region as a result of conflicting
concerns over (1) the preservation of irrigated agriculture and the resultant
economic relationships in a farming area with few profitable alternatives,
(2) San Antonio's thirst for increased municipal and industrial water
resources, (3) environmental/recreational water values within some of
Texas's most unique attractions, and (4) the role of spring discharges for
maintaining surface water supply. Calls for self-restraint in groundwater
use and development were firmly rejected by the agricultural community
and led to secession of two rural counties from the Edwards Underground
Water District in 1989. A downstream river authority possessing springflow-dependent surface water rights filed suit.to have the aquifer declared
an underground stream, in which case the groundwater body would be
administered on the same basis as surface water," In another recently
filed suit, the Sierra Club seeks to apply the Endangered Species Act to
obtain pumping restrictions adequate for protecting minimal springflow
for Comal Springs.59 On May 7, 1991 San Antonio citizens ratified an
initiative to halt the controversial but partially completed Applewhite
Reservoir which was to provide the city with its first surface water supplies. The City Water Board responded with a suit seeking to invalidate
the vote.
Amidst all this controversy, the stakes get higher as water withdrawals
increase and new wells are completed. A newly established aquacultural
enterprise west of San Antonio has a well flowing under artesian pressure
at 48,000 acre-feet per year." This new demand upon the Edwards has
alarmed many users.
These tensions have focused a lot of attention on the region. The general
consensus is that legal reform is required and that the resulting institutions
53.
54.
55.
56,
57.
58.
DIST.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id., at 19.
id., at 14.
Id., at 14.
In re The Adjudication of Rights To Water in the Edwards Aquifer, No. 89-0381 (22nd JUD.
Tex. filed June 15, 1989).
Sierra Club v. Manual Lujan, No. Mo-91-CA061 (W. D. Tex. filed May 17, 1991).
See Austin American-Statesman, I (August 17, 1991).
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will serve as a model for similar reform throughout the state. The issue
confronting lawmakers is to erect a new system of groundwater law that
is well engineered for balancing the varied interests of the Edwards' many
suitors.
How Could Groundwater Law Be Usefully Changed?
Before settling upon the appropriations doctrine for the management
of surface water, Texas had labored with other legal doctrines and eventually found them unsuited for the conditions and needs of the state. 6'
The historical willingness to experiment with alternative water management institutions suggests that the protectionist concept that groundwater
legal doctrine is immutable in Texas is fundamentally invalid. It is equally
apparent in the face of growing conflict that absolute ownership has
become ineffective due to evolving scarcity and the altered demands of
the state. Recent legislative experience in urging landowners to form
groundwater management districts has not been successful, because the
to-be-regulated groundwater users are little interested in creating a potentially oppressive agency and, if created, the district is politically obligated to its members and is therefore reluctant to pursue substantive
change. Another option is to develop a new body of regulatory law
empowering an agency of government to design and enforce limits upon
groundwater pumpage and/or the manner in which groundwater is employed in individual uses. 62 This is the command-and-control path which
was eventually taken by Arizona after a long history of unsettling dispute.63

With the following exceptions, proposals for groundwater law reform
do not borrow from the State's positive experience with surface water
markets. An extensive study commissioned by the City of San Antonio
and the Edwards Underground Water District highlighted supply enhancement and water conservation policies, but it did at least mention
the marketing option. This study did not seriously consider such a policy.'
Two years ago the Texas Legislature considered, but did not pass, the
Edwards Aquifer Administration Act which would have established marketable groundwater rights for the region.6' Groundwater rights were
61. See Chang and Griffin, supra note 3.
62. The idea of setting pumpage limits has attracted considerable attention within the longstanding
debate over allocating Edwards Aquifer water. Recently filed legislation proposes to reduce irrigation
water consumption by 10% by the year 2000. See SB 1404 § I 1.554(8)(c) and companion bill HB
2437 filed March 3, 1991.
63. The Arizona approach is a command-and-control institution, because it is centralized and
regulatory rather than decentralized and incentive-oriented. One commentator has suggested that this
approach is testimony to how wrong things.can go. See Gisser, supra note 40.
64. See report by CH2M HILL Central, Inc., San Antonio Regional Water Resource Study (1986).
65. See S.B. 1441,71st Leg. (1989) and companion bill H.B. 2771, 71st Leg. (1989).
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proposed to be correlative (no seniorities) and determined according to
each well's maximum use over the preceding ten-year period.' Although
the Bill did not strictly employ the prior appropriation doctrine and included unnecessary language barring speculation, requiring vague conservation activities, and initiating a brief race to drill more wells, it did
represent a strong move toward groundwater marketing.
The final report of a special legislative committee completed in 1991
concludes that three policy options are available for the Edwards Aquifer:
(1) ". . . declare that groundwater, like surface water, is the property of
the state, and to develop laws that regulate and manage groundwater
throughout the state"; (2) have the Edwards Aquifer Underground Water
Conservation District regulate pumping; and (3) create a new "management entity" to regulate groundwater.6 7 Although the first option is sufficiently expansive to permit an interpretation encompassing transferable
groundwater rights, this was not envisioned within the report which actually emphasized regulatory action.
A model groundwater doctrine should be adopted for the Edwards
Aquifer with the intent that it be progressively revised and implemented
for the rest of the state. Basic elements for this new body of law include
the adjudication of rights based upon historical use, seniority via the prior
appropriation doctrine, metering of future use with established penalties
for exceeding permit limitations, transferability by amendment with TWC
oversight, and TWC limitations upon cumulative local drawdown effects
caused by groundwater transfers. Within the adjudication process, a specific amount of rights should be granted to agencies or groups acting as
caretakers of the important springflows produced by the Edwards Aquifer.
The variability of annual recharge implies that all permits will not be
satisfied each year, and the TWC will have to inform junior appropriators
when their permits cannot be fulfilled, as in the surface water system. If
secondary economic effects are perceived as legitimate social interests
requiring protection, then some form of compensatory arrangement, such
as those mentioned previously, can be integrated within water law.
Overall, this proposal acts to create an incentive system for attaining
appropriate levels of groundwater use, conservation, and groundwater
and surface water development. It borrows from Texas's positive and
growing reliance upon surface water marketing and, more importantly,
it effectively brings surface water and groundwater laws into confluence.
IV. THE NEED FOR CONJUNCTIVE MANAGEMENT
Numerous scholars of western water problems and policy have reacted
negatively to the unfortunate fact that most states employ different bodies
66. Id.

67. Supra note 50.
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of law in administering groundwater and surface water. With the noteworthy exceptions of Colorado and New Mexico, most state laws ignore
the hydrological connection of these waters, and nowhere is this more
true than in Texas. It has been reported that Texas groundwater law is
the main obstacle for achieving needed conjunctive management in the
state.68 Whatever the historical reasons for these disparities, one can safely
assume that growing conflict between surface water and groundwater
users will bring about better integration between legal doctrines. Otherwise, conflict will persist. It seems advantageous to respond to the problem as soon as possible.
Attention to the pure hydrologic interface between all water users
produces important insights regarding institutional deficiencies. Viewed
from this perspective, all groundwater withdrawals either reduce surface
water outflows or induce compensating groundwater recharge from a
surface water supply.69 As a result of groundwater diffusivity and the
distance between groundwater wells and affected watercourses, the effect
of groundwater withdrawal upon surface water supply is delayed, and
the delay may be measured in days orthousands of years. 7' In the limit,
any increase in water supply achieved through groundwater development
is temporary. Eventually, all groundwater development is accomplished
by equal reductions in surface waters. In the case of the highly mobile
waters of the Edwards Aquifer, these effects are rather immediate, and
the "rights" of surface water users are obviously subordinated to groundwater users in the process.
This situation can be rectified by establishing groundwater rights in
accordance with the proposal outlined above. The establishment of fixed
groundwater rights will necessarily establish concrete limits upon the
influences all water users can impose on one another. The result will be
a clearer understanding of each person's rights thereby fostering responsible coordination rather than conflict. While other paths can be pursued
for rectifying the doctrinal clash of present water laws in Texas, it is
most natural to employ a single doctrine for managing both major water
forms.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Summarizing the major points of this discussion:
0 Water is not completely amenable to market allocation, but through
careful design of both property rights and market limitations, much
68. See 0. Templer, Conjunctive Management of Water Resources in the Context of Texas Water
Law. 16 Wat. Resources Bull. 305 (1980).
69. See W. Balleau, Water Appropriation and Transfer in a General Hydrogeologic System, 28
Nat. Res. J. 269 (1988). Also, see Gisser, supra note 40.
70. Id.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

*
o

o

*

o

[Vol. 32

can be achieved by relying upon market incentives. Price is the
embodiment of available information on the scarcity of water and
is an effective tool for motivating appropriatelevels of individual
action in response to this scarcity.
Recognition of water-related interdependencies aids in the successful design and administration of a water market.
Market activity in the Rio Grande Valley has had a substantially
positive influence upon the region, but some special characteristics
of this region imply that full extension to the rest of the state is
impractical in the absence of some controls. This region is unique
because of the general absence of external effects relating to return
flows, instream flows, and secondary economic effects.
Surface water marketing should be conducted in an institutional
framework which causes the market to react to return flow externalities, instream flow values, and if the protection of current
economic relationships is socially desirable, secondary economic
effects. As a result, water market participation must be controlled
so as to observe and account for these important third party impacts.
As in the case of surface water, Texas can benefit from legal reform
to enable groundwater marketing if drawdown interrelationships,
groundwater exhaustability, and secondary effects (if sanctioned)
can be formally confronted. Opportunities for achieving these
conditions are available and have been identified.
Policy tools are available for limiting market deficiencies in the
case of the several possible external effects for both surface water
and groundwater forms. As a consequence, water marketing can
serve the state much more broadly than it is currently.

